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1955: Black Sash women march to the Union Buildings 
to hand over a petition protesting at the extension of 
the pass laws to the Deputy Prime Minister.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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Established in 1955, the Black Sash is one of the oldest human rights organisations in South Africa – and it is still relevant. It plays a key role in monitoring the South African government’s implementation of policy. 
The Sash monitoring system is attached to a sophisticated advocacy strategy 
that is constantly evolving, like the organisation. 
This booklet documents the best practice advocacy model that is the 
Black Sash. Whilst some of what the Sash engages in and how it does it is 
unique and specific to the organisation’s culture and historical currency, it is 
undoubtedly an example of how civil society can make an impact. 
I. Introduction
1958: Women waiting in long queues at the 
Department of Bantu Affairs to apply for 
passes allowing them to remain in urban areas. 
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
6 HOLDING GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT – ADVOCACY IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF THE BLACK SASH
1960: Black Sash member pickets to defend 
university autonomy.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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“In the 1950s, we were newsworthy, perhaps 
because we were riding the tide of white protest 
against the ruthless determination of the 
government at the time, to impose what later 
became known as apartheid […] In the 1960s, 
we were labeled as communists and were 
shouted at and told we ought to be at home 
in our kitchens looking after our children […] 
In the turbulent 1970s, we became the flavour 
of the month inside South Africa and for many 
of the people worldwide who were beginning 
to regard apartheid as a great evil […] In the 
second half of the 1980s, people began to ask 
why we were still in existence because the pass 
laws had been repealed in June 1986 and few 
saw what use we would be after that […] In the 
1990s, many people were sure we were dead 
because, they said, there was nothing left for us 
to do […] Now, in the 21st century, we are still 
at it.“ – Sheena Duncan, former Black Sash 
National President, 20051 
The Black Sash has occupied an important 
space in its 54 years of existence.  A volunteer-
based, activist organisation driven by its 
membership base during apartheid, today it is 
a professional non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) that implements human rights 
programmes through its skilled, professional 
staff. 
II.  Background to the 
Black Sash
1998: Sheena Duncan, former Black Sash National President, at the Speak 
Out on Poverty Hearings organised by the South African Human Rights 
Commission, the Commission on Gender Equality and the South African 
National NGO Coalition.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
1 Quoted from the Black Sash (2005), “Golden Jubilee 
Report: 1955-2005”
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Phase I (Pre-1990)
The Black Sash was formed in 1955 by six white women who wanted to 
express their outrage at the apartheid government’s intention to pass the 
Senate Bill. This piece of legislation would increase government support in the 
Senate, facilitating the passing of the Separate Representation of Voters Act that 
would remove coloureds (people of mixed racial descent) from the common 
voters’ roll, violating an entrenched clause in the South African Constitution of 
1910. 
During its days as an activist organisation, the Sash’s advocacy work centred 
on attempting to influence white morality in the country, within the context 
of the 1910 Constitution. Constantly questioning the constitutional validity 
of several pieces of apartheid legislation, the Sash was initially known as the 
Women’s Defence of the Constitution League. At the time, their advocacy 
strategy was based on mass meetings, vigils and petitions. Also, the Sash often 
set up a cell system and telephone network to communicate with members.
From 1956 to the early 1960s, the Sash advocacy strategy developed 
into a public education approach twinned with protest action. The public 
education angle was part of a strategy to influence and shift the morality and 
mindset of whites. At the same time, advice offices were set up in urban areas 
to assist black people who fell foul of apartheid laws. These offices provided 
support and free paralegal services, addressing concerns around housing, 
unemployment, pensions, influx control and detention without trial. Also at 
this time, the Sash extended its membership to all women in South Africa.
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, increased state repression caused Sash 
membership to dwindle. However, its advice offices flourished. Much time 
was spent building them, giving the Sash women first-hand experience of the 
effect of apartheid on blacks. During this time the Sash continued its public 
protests and monitored government policy, legislation and action, as well 
as the courts. The organisation also monitored and recorded protests, rallies, 
arrests, detentions and deaths. 
1959: Women are arrested and taken to 
court for pass law offences.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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Phase II (1990-1999)
The period 1990-1994 introduced far-reaching change in South Africa. The 
African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid groups were 
unbanned. Political prisoners, like Nelson Mandela, were released. Negotiations 
for the transition from apartheid to democracy began. On his release from 
prison, future President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela2, acknowledged the 
Black Sash’s role during the struggle against apartheid:
“I salute the Black Sash [...] We note with pride that you have acted as the 
conscience of white South Africa. Even during the darkest days in the history of 
our struggle you held the flag of liberty high.”
Pre-1994, the Sash monitored the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(Codesa) negotiations and pushed for a new constitution, founded on a bill of 
rights.
The Sash also formed LegiWatch, a group of Sash women who monitored 
legislation in Parliament. During negotiations LegiWatch also monitored the 
Codesa process.
In addition, the Sash provided voter training for the first democratic 
elections in 1994. 
As the country transitioned, questions and debate started among the 
Sash members and trustees about the organisation’s role in the future, in 
a democratic state. There were those who felt the Sash’s work was done as 
democracy dawned, but the majority felt the Sash’s continued monitoring was 
just as important in a democracy as under apartheid. Chairperson of the Sash 
Board of Trustees Sibongile Mkhabela3 says:
“For any democracy to work, you need critical mass on the ground to hold 
government accountable. Black Sash chose to remain on the ground and to 
monitor and play a watchdog role […] Black Sash takes democracy seriously; it’s 
not just a matter of voting but also about maintaining an active civil society.”
And so, the decision that held out was that the Sash would remain a civil 
society watchdog.
Di Oliver4, a Sash Board Member, remembers that while there was political 
change, people still queued for help at the Black Sash advice offices. To the 
Sash, this indicated that its work needed to continue, even if not in the same 
form as under apartheid. 
The organisation itself also transformed, evolving in its form and function. 
It changed from a membership-driven, volunteer, activist organisation into a 
professional NGO with full-time, paid staff members and a Board of Trustees. 
The Sash maintained its advice offices, knowing they were fundamental to the 
rest of its work. The organisation also developed its human rights programmes 
1956: The Black Sash convoy arrives in Cape 
Town on Parliament’s Joint Sitting Day, 
dubbed ‘Sash Monday’ by the press.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
2 See the Black Sash website: www.blacksash.
org.za.
3  Interview on 21 November 2008 at the offices 
of the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, 
Johannesburg.
4  Interview on 11 November 2008 at the home 
of Di Oliver, Cape Town.
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further, implementing them through a rights education approach, advocacy 
and the advice offices. 
In the 1994-1999 period, the newly elected, inexperienced democratic 
government was eager to work with civil society, so spaces opened up for 
organisations to assist in drafting legislation and monitoring its impact. Sash 
Board Member Jenny de Tolley5 remembers that government looked towards 
trusted organisations for support.  The Black Sash was excited at the possibility 
of a responsive government, and that organisations like the Sash could 
impact on legislation to improve the lives of poor people. The Sash helped 
draft legislation, made inputs to Parliamentary standing committees, and its 
advice offices monitored the impact of legislation. 
Phase III (1999-2007)
Between 1999 and 2007, the political environment changed drastically. Many 
spaces open to civil society tightened and some closed. The constructive 
and collaborative relationships established with government officials and 
provincial Members of the Executive Council (MECs) changed. A more 
adversarial attitude started permeating the halls of government.
Some government officials felt helpless about implementation of service 
delivery.  Parliamentary portfolio committees were sidelined and left out of 
the national decision-making processes by the Presidency. This closing off of 
vital public participation affected the Sash’s ability to impact on policy and 
legislation like before.
There was a significant shift in government’s approach to civil society 
organisations. Former Black Sash Advocacy Officer Isobel Frye6 observed this 
change:
“Between 1994 and 1999 there was a rights-based engagement from both civil 
society and government. Positions in government were occupied by former 
civil society practitioners. There was a mutual recognition of the historical 
significance of the new Constitution. By 2000, there was a shift from a rights-
1988: 29 Black Sash members hold an 
illegal group picket.
Photograph: Merry Dewar 
5  Interview on 11 November 2008 at the home 
of Jenny de Tolley, Cape Town. 
6  Interview with Isobel Frye on 24 November 
2008 at the offices of Studies into Poverty 
and Inequality Institute in Johannesburg.
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based approach to a technocratic approach by government. The discourse 
shifted to the cost implications for every submission put forward from civil 
society, placing a burden on civil society organisations to engage in number- 
crunching exercises.”
After 1999, the Sash strategy of a cooperative relationship with 
government often resulted in frustration at not being heard nor being able to 
shift service delivery as before. Now the Sash’s advocacy had to become far 
more hard-hitting and they used litigation to compel government to be more 
accountable regarding service delivery. Also, the advice offices began using 
litigation to get a response from government on service delivery challenges.
At one time, the Durban Regional Office referred 145 cases for litigation. 
This made the Department of Social Development (DoSD) sit up and pay 
attention (Black Sash, 2004:27). However, the government’s attention lapsed 
again and the Durban Regional Office had to resort to litigation once more, 
again with positive results.
Di Oliver is of the opinion that “government sometimes would only listen 
when there was litigation”.  Whilst litigation got the desired response from 
government, the Sash still only uses litigation as an absolute last resort, after 
all avenues of cooperative engagement are exhausted and no solutions are 
forthcoming.
The Black Sash’s main advocacy objective is to bring about change in 
the lives of people by engaging with government in a way that builds 
relationships as far as possible.
Phase IV (After 2008)
This period again sees the Sash reflecting on its role and strategic positioning. 
It recognises it has been playing a monitoring and advocacy role since 1955 
and therefore has very high skills levels in this field. Now its strategy is to 
build the advice offices to become independent units, able to do more than 
administer rights-based legal advice.
Advice offices are changed to become regional offices with regional 
Candlelight vigil 1993: The murder of South 
African Communist Party leader, Chris 
Hani, threatened to derail the multiparty 
negotiations but the ANC and the government 
reached agreement on a Government of 
National Unity with a Transitional Executive 
Council.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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directors heading up the offices. Each is responsible for its own advocacy 
programme and engages directly with provincial government and other 
structures.
As advocacy is decentralised, national advocacy programme managers will 
help regional offices to develop region-specific advocacy strategies, linked to 
local community experiences. In order to make this possible, regional offices 
will conduct their own analyses of the data coming through their offices as 
well as from other NGO advice offices. In addition, community voices will 
be bolstered so they can become their own advocates rather than the Sash 
speaking on behalf of poor communities. Says Sibongile Mkhabela: 
“[It is about] enabling communities to articulate their own rights rather than 
the Black Sash articulating these on their behalf […] where community leaders 
take charge of their own issues […] where we build community advocates.”
At the national level, the Sash positions itself as a national advocacy body 
that will provide support to locally-based advice offices, other NGOs, and 
community resource centres. Member of the Black Sash Board of Trustees 
Yasmin Sooka7 feels that:
 “the Black Sash advice offices are now playing a much more nuanced role. It 
must now use these skills it has to offer skills and services to other advice offices.”
The organisation will develop database systems that will more effectively 
capture local data and feed it to the national database in order to identify 
national trends and inform national advocacy campaigns.
The Sash will also provide capacity-building support to organisations, 
sharing its wealth of experience in lobbying, making submissions to 
government, planning and engaging in advocacy.
Cape Town Advice Office staff Leonie 
Caroline  (left, foreground), Regional 
Director, and Morgan Disipi, Paralegal, 
take clients through one of the Black Sash’s 
information booklets, “You & Debt”. The 
booklet serves as an introduction to debt 
and the questions that should be asked when 
taking a loan.
Photograph: Benny Gool 
7  Interview with Yasmin Sooka on 24 
November 2008 at the offices of the 
Foundation for Human Rights. 
HOLDING GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT – ADVOCACY IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF THE BLACK SASH 13
The Black Sash has a rich history of advocacy under apartheid and transformed itself into a professional advocacy organisation after the advent of democracy in 1994. During its lifespan, the organisation has 
seen many changes to its structure and functioning, all aimed at keeping it 
relevant to the political context of the time. 
The structure of the Black Sash
The Black Sash structure makes it an efficient and effective advocacy 
organisation. The National Office, which houses the National Director and 
programme staff, is literally around the corner from Parliament. This gives the 
Sash easy access to ministers, government officials and Parliamentary processes. 
Sash staff walk over to Parliament for informal discussions with officials, as well 
as to keep in the loop of policy and legislative developments. 
The National Director manages the strategic direction of the organisation 
and ensures the Sash’s voice is heard on issues central to its work. The national 
programme team, composed of a National Programme Director and four 
advocacy programme managers, is responsible for the national programme 
and forms the engine room of the organisation. The team drives programme 
implementation in the regions and ensures a link between the regions and the 
National Office. The team also monitors national legislative changes. 
Today the Sash has seven regional offices. Previously known as advice offices, 
they are located in Cape Town, Knysna, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, Durban, 
Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg. As mentioned, the regional offices are 
headed by regional directors. The directors are supported by paralegals.
The paralegals capture the cases of people from the community who come 
for help, and engage in rights education. They analyse emerging trends and 
do advocacy work in their own areas, including discussions and negotiations 
with provincial government, MECs and Parliamentary portfolio committees. The 
regional offices also monitor service delivery. As said before, advocacy at the 
regional level is supported by the national advocacy programme managers. 
III.  Advocacy and the 
Black Sash
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Figure 1: The structure of the advocacy team 
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Ulrike Albrecht (middle), Black Sash Trainer, 
participate in a Black Sash paralegal session.
Photograph: Debbie Yazbek 
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The functions of the Black Sash 
The Black Sash concentrates on three programmatic areas: Comprehensive 
social security, consumer protection for the poor, and social services and 
subsidies.
The comprehensive social security programme is the Black Sash’s biggest 
programme. It aims to close policy gaps in social security and work towards 
the realisation of rights. 
“The current social protection measures,  vis-à-vis social assistance, provide a 
‘survival mode’ safety net only to certain households who are fortunate enough 
to contain individuals in the current target groups. These include the disabled, 
elderly and very young. Children between the ages of 15 and 18 and the 
unemployed are currently excluded. Furthermore, large proportions of working 
people do not benefit from private retirement or health savings and, further, 
certain categories of persons are excluded from social insurance i.e. domestic 
workers and those in the informal sector, and casual and temporarily employed. 
The struggle for a comprehensive social security system is therefore all the more 
necessary, as it is the poor who suffer most when these systems are weakened 
or not sufficiently resourced to cushion us during times of economic crisis.”  –  
Marcella Naidoo, Black Sash National Director, 20088
The consumer protection programme aims to build a fair credit and 
consumer environment. The social services and subsidies programme aims to 
ensure accountable governance and service delivery.
The three programmes are interlinked for everybody who uses the Sash 
services. For example, clients coming for advice on welfare grants are advised 
about credit systems and helped in their struggle to access government’s free 
services and asset-building opportunities.
The Sash has a three-pronged implementation strategy for the three 
programme areas – it uses rights-based education, advocacy and advice-
giving. The regional offices implement the programmes in communities.
Through its programmes, the Black Sash informs communities about their 
1991: Khayelitsha residents inspect the 
still-smouldering wreckage of shacks and 
the burnt-out hulk of a taxi after a night of 
violence attributed to the taxi war.
Photograph: Willie de Klerk, The Argus 
8  Quoted from “Black Sash – Making Human 
Rights Real. The Black Sash Report for 2008” 
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rights under the Constitution and in law.
Clients are assisted to access these rights by paralegals based in the 
regional offices. The Sash then analyses case logs of assisted clients to identify 
emerging trends and developments, which inform its ongoing advocacy 
strategies. 
Advice-giving is the third overall Black Sash strategic approach. Advice-
giving is also aimed at enabling individuals and groups to exercise their socio-
economic rights prescribed by law. The Sash provides comprehensive quality 
advice on labour, citizenship, and social and consumer protection, such as 
credit, debt and contracts. 
The Black Sash advocacy strategy straddles its rights-based education 
and advice-giving components. The advocacy strategy has five key 
implementation areas.
The first and second key implementation areas are tracking, and 
understanding policy and legislative developments in the three programme 
areas. The third and fourth key implementation areas are conducting research 
in the core focus areas, and monitoring service delivery at key service points 
in the country. The fifth key implementation area is building the network of 
advice centres to enable better data collection and advice-giving at the local 
level. 
Advocacy tools used by the Black Sash to engage in advocacy include 
campaigns, coalition work, networking, submissions to Parliament and 
political parties, lobbying, using the media, and litigation. 
The Sash recognises the value of having both its advice offices 
and advocacy component. It continually meshes the two to build a 
comprehensive advocacy strategy. 
Marcella Naidoo (left), Black Sash National 
Director, and Nceba Mafongosi, Advocacy 
Unit Regional Manager, make signs in 
preparation for a Black Sash campaign.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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Taking advocacy to the people 
The strength of the Black Sash regional offices enhances the advocacy work 
of the organisation. The regional offices offer a direct connection between 
the local community and the National Office where strategy is developed and 
where interventions are considered and implemented.
However, the Sash wants to move away from being an advocate for others 
– a role the organisation feels it has played for almost too long – and play 
a more enabling role where it renders assistance and support to advocacy 
initiatives driven by communities. Whilst the Sash will continue to engage in 
advocacy work, this will be at the highest level of engagement with national 
government and in monitoring legislative reform. 
The Sash is committed to achieving maximum impact in the lives of 
poor and marginalised people.  To this end, each regional office will start 
focusing on at least one struggling, disadvantaged community per year. Such 
communities will be selected by Sash staff in the satellite offices, or they can 
be identified through advocacy campaigns or rights-based work.
Committed to playing an enabling role, the organisation will give 
selected communities space to lead on identified issues and to turn these 
into community mobilisation challenges. The Sash will work with legitimate 
and valid community structures and with smaller groups that have broad 
acceptance in the community.
With the support of their advocacy programme managers, regional 
offices will work autonomously with selected communities to decide how 
to strategise advocacy to ensure cross-pollination of strategies among the 
different regions, but also to help each region define a strategy directly 
applicable to a specific context and community.
By adopting this new advocacy strategy, the Black Sash is making advocacy 
more relevant to local communities. It is also helping to grow local advocates 
who can speak for communities and for themselves. 
Nelisiwe Hlophe (wearing AIDS ribbon), 
Durban Regional Office Paralegal, reaching 
out to a client. 
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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Durban Regional Office staff and volunteers. Standing from left to 
right: Nelisiwe Xaba, Henry Webster, Marie Therese Naidoo, Bill 
Ramsden, M Matiwane and Thulie Ntuli. Sitting from left to right: 
Njabulo Khumalo and two volunteers.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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Black Sash advocacy work is rooted in its regional offices. Each regional office is staffed by paralegals tasked with providing comprehensive and quality legal advice. 
Among the steady stream of office clients are people who cannot get relief 
in their efforts to address problems with the state or an employer. They know 
their rights are infringed because of the Sash’s rights-based education in their 
communities. 
In most cases paralegal work will involve mediation, negotiation or a 
discussion with the other party. Sometimes issues are easily resolved. When 
they cannot be resolved, pro bono lawyers or legal NGOs like the Legal 
Resources Centre (LRC) or Lawyers for Human Rights are accessed to help. 
Collective steps may be needed when a regional trend is emerging and 
cases cannot be solved by paralegals. In these instances the regional office 
engages the relevant provincial government to assist in solving the problem. 
If the provincial government does not alleviate the problem, the regional 
office contacts the National Office for support.
The National Office then conducts a trends analysis with other regional 
offices to ascertain the extent of the problem. If other offices have similar 
problems, the National Office undertakes research to pinpoint where the 
problem lies. 
IV.  The Black Sash  
advocacy model
20 HOLDING GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT – ADVOCACY IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF THE BLACK SASH
The regional advice offices: A typical case9
Thandi Dlomo applied for a child support grant from the DoSD. After a 
year she is still waiting for a response from them. She has been to the 
offices of the DoSD and the South African Social Services Association 
(SASSA) many times. At each visit a new problem emerges. 
In sheer desperation she seeks the assistance of the Johannesburg Black 
Sash Regional Office. Here she is greeted at reception, asked for details 
such as her name, address and contact numbers, and her details are 
entered into an electronic database. Thandi is then assigned a paralegal 
who sits down with her and documents her full story.
After Thandi leaves, the paralegal makes a few phone calls to people she 
knows at the department and SASSA to find out what the problem is. 
She then writes a formal letter to SASSA requesting a response to the 
application within the legally required time frame. The paralegal takes 
every necessary step to keep Thandi’s case file up-to-date and solve her 
problem.
First thing in the morning and at the end of each day, the Regional 
Director logs all the cases that have come through the office on the 
Black Sash’s national database. Thandi’s case will be among them. The 
information gathered is then fed to the National Office where the cases are 
analysed and trends identified. 
The research interrogates policy implementation and the law with regard 
to a particular government service. It aims to uncover whether problems 
brought to a regional office are the result of bad policy or service delivery. 
Once the research is done, the Black Sash prepares a case with supporting 
regional office data. A meeting is then set up and the information is presented 
to the relevant national department. The Black Sash will consider litigation 
as a final strategy if the meeting and further discussions with the relevant 
department do not bear fruit. 
9  The information in the text box is based on 
an example from the Gauteng Regional 
Office. All Black Sash regional offices deal 
with cases in the same way. The information 
was sourced from an interview with 
Thandiwe Zulu, Gauteng Regional Director.
1986: Hunger, poverty and repression worsens 
– children queue for soup.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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At the point of litigation, the Black Sash seeks legal opinion from lawyers 
based most frequently at the LRC, due to the partnership and relationship that 
developed historically between the two organisations. The LRC will deliberate 
on the case and provide a legal opinion on whether the Black Sash should 
proceed with litigation. If approval is given, the Sash, together with the LRC, 
will lodge a case against the government. 
Outside of this, the Black Sash also engages in lobbying government to 
reform legislation or policy. During apartheid it was pointless trying to make 
legislative submissions or to try to reform the law. But democracy presented 
an opportunity to the Sash to engage in lobbying as an additional tool in its 
advocacy toolbox. 
According to Board Member Jenny de Tolley10:
“At around the ’94 period, the Black Sash was going in many directions. We 
knew that if we were going to take on this advocacy role we needed to narrow 
our focus and become more specialist.”
Former Sash National Advocacy Manager Allison Tilley11 agrees that 
1994 presented a different context. South African civil society now had a 
democratic government it could engage with. This push into advocacy 
prompted the Sash to narrow its focus and become more specialised. Hence it 
focused its attention on social assistance system issues. 
The Sash also reflected on whether public protest was achieving any 
significant shift in delivery to the poor. It found protests did not bring 
change, nor achieve law reform. It therefore decided to take up government’s 
encouragement of public participation, dialogue and cooperation.
In its attempt to learn more about advocacy and, in particular, lobbying as 
a tool, the Sash studied advocacy models. It gained much from the United 
States, especially from an American lobbyist who visited Parliament in the 
mid-1990s. 
Siphiwo Moneli (left), Grahamstown 
Regional Office Paralegal, attends to a 
client. The Black Sash helps clients access 
more than R1 million in social grants and 
private pensions each month.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
10  Interview on 11 November 2008 with Jenny 
de Tolley at her home in Cape Town.
11  Interview on 11 November 2008 with Allison 
Tilley at the offices of Alliance for Children’s 
Entitlement to Social Security, Cape Town.
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The case of attribution
Organisations can use three mechanisms to measure success:
• Run surveys to show trends of increase or decrease after an intervention 
•  Use their own language in submissions. Decision-makers who use 
submissions often use this language 
•  Use people’s real stories to back up submissions to ensure interventions 
are real too
The Black Sash has learnt from studying international advocacy models, 
as well as from its own experience. In particular, it has learnt to always 
include public advocacy in its strategy. In most cases public myth and 
misunderstanding can cloud an issue. It is important to deal with general 
perceptions and develop a common understanding.
Another lesson the Sash has learnt is that it is important to know the 
political terrain. When laying the groundwork for tackling an issue, it is 
important to know who in government is supportive of the issue and of the 
work of the organisation and get them on board. This means spending time 
building relationships and strategic partnerships, not just with government 
officials but also with civil society organisations, other state entities and 
Chapter 9 Institutions.
The Black Sash has established a good relationship with civil-society 
Parliamentary monitors who know what legislation is being tabled for reform, 
and the calendar of when it will happen. By establishing these strategic 
relationships, the Black Sash has its finger on the law reform pulse and is 
always present when legislation falling within the ambit of the Sash’s work is 
tabled.
A third lesson learnt is to maintain transparency with government. The Sash 
always states up front what it is about and what its vision and mission are, and 
constantly checks that it sticks to its own principles. 
Henry Webster (right), a volunteer at the 
Durban Regional Office, assists clients.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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Strengths of the advocacy model
The Black Sash advocacy model has four key strengths. 
Firstly, the model is based on an ever-evolving strategy that is conscious of 
and responsive to changes in the political environment.  
The second strength of the advocacy model is its full integration into the 
work of the Black Sash. Advocacy is not a separate programme or project. It is 
the foundation for the Sash’s work. All other interventions link into it. Jenny de 
Tolley describes Sash advocacy as forming part of a “full cycle”. Each strategic 
Sash intervention is linked to advocacy. 
Figure 2: The Black Sash advocacy cycle
A third strength of the Black Sash advocacy model is that it monitors the 
implementation of reformed policies and law. Monitoring happens at the 
regional offices where cases are presented. The regions are the barometer of 
deficits in government policy. From cases presented in the regions, the Sash 
can gauge key issues and use these to develop advocacy strategies. The Sash 
also monitors service delivery at key points in the regions and specifically 
checks whether services are efficient. 
Through reflection and experience, the organisation identified that it 
needed to have a narrower and more specialised focus. The key question 
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– What does the organisation want? – was asked, and led to the answer: 
A comprehensive social security system. Further questions about whom it 
should target and how it would get what it wants formed the building blocks 
of its advocacy strategy, which is shaped and underpinned by the Sash’s core 
organisational values: Justice, dignity, affirmation of women, integrity, non-
violence, rigour, independence, courage and volunteerism. 
Adversarial versus collaborative: 
The use of litigation 
One of the tools in the Black Sash’s advocacy toolbox is litigation. As 
mentioned earlier, the Sash sometimes works with legal NGOs like the LRC to 
force accountability and transparency on service delivery issues in the courts. 
It uses litigation in two instances:
•  When individual cases cannot be resolved through discussion and 
negotiation, regional offices take them to pro bono lawyers. 
•  When the Sash identifies worrisome trends. Sometimes a regional office 
sees a trend emerging just in its own region. If the trend occurs only there 
it deals with it regionally. If it is a national trend, it gets addressed at the 
national level. 
2000: Black Sash activists demonstrate 
against cuts on social spending on Budget 
Day. The poster in the top right corner reads: 
“Our children are hungry – But the state 
buys weapons”.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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Using litigation: An example from the Durban Regional 
Office (1999/2000)12
In the second half of the 1990s, delays in the DoSD’s processing of welfare 
grant applications became a major problem. The majority of people who 
went to the Black Sash for help had already struggled for six months to a 
year to get a proper response from the department. Initially, the Sash sent 
a friendly letter asking for a substantive response within 21 days. This was 
followed by numerous telephone calls and at least two follow-up letters. In 
addition, the Sash raised its concerns at the bi-monthly paralegal sectoral 
meeting facilitated by the department.
In 1999 the Sash had no other option but to refer 145 cases for litigation. 
The clients were already waiting for a year to a year and half for a response. 
The litigation yielded the desired results for these cases and also for a range 
of other Sash clients.
From May 1999 to June 2000, the Sash held regular meetings with the 
provincial Director-General of Welfare, Durban regional staff and district 
officials to discuss cases and Sash findings in monitoring applications and 
pay points.
These strategies helped the Sash resolve more delayed cases, led to the 
upgrading of infrastructure and resources at district offices, as well as to the 
retraining of staff. Yet, at least 25% of Sash cases remained unresolved.
In May 2000 the Sash addressed the KwaZulu-Natal Welfare Portfolio 
Committee, highlighting a number of social assistance delivery issues. It 
alerted the Committee to delays, highlighted that this constituted a failure 
to meet people’s constitutional right to just administrative action, as well as 
the Sash’s reasons for resorting to litigation.
In July 2000 the Sash once again referred 30 cases to the LRC and 
private attorneys for litigation. This again resulted in faster resolution of 
outstanding cases.
12 From the Black Sash, “Conference on 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 – a tool for transforming delivery in 
South Africa”, pp 27-28, October 2004.
Gauteng Regional Office Director, Thandiwe 
Zulu (third from the left), flanked by a 
volunteer and Wellington Ntamo, Paralegal, 
to her left, and Thifulufheli Sithumule, also 
Paralegal, to her right.
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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When service delivery fails it often happens because a government 
department is breaking the law or there is a structural problem within the 
department or within a delivery agent. In both instances, Black Sash regional 
offices exhaust every possible avenue to get an issue resolved. This includes 
meeting with government officials, for example a person in the SASSA with 
whom the regional office has a relationship.
At this meeting, the Sash will sit with the official, explain the issues and 
give possible options to resolve the problem. Thereafter, the Sash will offer to 
cooperate with and assist the official in solving the problem.
If there is a structural problem, the Sash usually meets with the chief 
directorate of the relevant department. Again, the aim of the discussion is to 
find solutions and a basis for cooperation.
When all of these cooperative options are exhausted and a solution is 
not found, the Sash opts for litigation and takes a class action to court. But, 
even in the litigation process, the Sash always leans towards finding solutions 
through other cooperative means.  
The Black Sash also uses impact litigation to challenge the constitutionality 
of government action, or to set a legal precedent that will transform policy or 
legislation. Isobel Frye is of the opinion that: 
“Litigation should always be there in democracies to uphold the 
implementation of the Constitution.”
The Constitutional Court itself maintains it does not get enough of these 
cases to allow for more depth and meaning to the Constitution. Cases in all 
courts help establish correct interpretations of the Constitution and ensure 
that the law interprets the Constitution correctly. Such impact litigation helps 
set benchmarks for government’s implementation  performance. 
Sibongile Mkhabela maintains litigation should set precedent and 
stresses that the Black Sash will keep using litigation as part of its advocacy 
strategy. However, she warns litigation should not be used as a whip to get 
government to respond to issues. The focus should be on achieving change 
and a broader impact rather than using litigation as a means to resolve 
S’celimpilo Shange, former Paralegal at the 
Gauteng Regional Office, at a paralegal 
training session. 
Photograph: Debbie Yazbek 
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individual cases. The purpose of litigation should be to achieve policy change 
to ensure effective administration. When litigation is used in this sense, change 
is made through the courts and a precedent is set. 
There is an acute awareness in the Black Sash of the state’s litigation costs. In 
May 2008, there were 8 35013 cases against the DoSD. The state’s costs in terms 
of legal fees are exorbitant. The Sash feels that this money could be better 
spent improving delivery systems and reforming the law. 
As emphasised above, the Black Sash maintains litigation should be used as 
a last resort. At times the pride of an organisation can get in the way of making 
sober judgements. The Black Sash is aware of this and continually guards 
against it. Allison Tilley warns that organisations 
“[...] should not be intransigent about an issue and try to bend the issue to the 
point where it breaks.”
Organisations should maintain a sober, mature outlook, stick to their 
objectives and what needs to be done to reach them, rather than burning 
bridges and painting themselves into a corner. 
Whilst high-impact cases are important for setting precedent that holds 
greater benefit for society more broadly, there are some challenges in taking 
on litigation, including high costs. Taking on litigation as an advocacy option 
can cost an NGO R100 000 or more14.
Legal NGOs like the LRC raise their own donor funds to support high-impact 
cases. But even if a legal NGO is used, advocacy organisations like the Black 
Sash caution against such partnerships if each partner does not have a clear 
own agenda to maintain control over the direction and purpose of the case.
According to the Sash, these relationships and partnerships are difficult to 
navigate because advocacy organisations and legal organisations come from 
different perspectives. The advocacy organisation can lose control of its own 
case. For example, legal NGOs do not have community consultation as part of 
their strategy when taking up high-impact litigation. As Isobel Frye puts it:
“Most lawyers don’t see it as their role to sit in communities to hear their stories or 
to report back to these communities. It’s just different backgrounds.” 
However, advocacy organisations taking on impact litigation need the 
services of legal NGOs, and legal NGOs need organisations like the Black Sash 
to access a client base. There is space to negotiate an equal partnership and 
establish mutual respect. It is important for advocacy organisations to maintain 
ownership of their cases in the face of an intimidating, new world such as 
litigation. One way to do this is to include social mobilisation and public 
advocacy as a support behind the litigation. 
Another challenge in terms of litigation is that cases require groundwork 
preparation before going to court. This, together with the actual court case, 
13  Social Assistance Bill and Litigation, 
8 May 2008. http://www.pmg.org.za/
report/20080508-social-assistance-
amendment-bill-and-litigation.
14  Telephonic interview with Geoff Budlender 
on 14 November 2008.
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can be very time-consuming. 
In high-impact cases, the aim of the litigation route is to set a precedent 
and bring about change in law. If the preparation of the case is shoddy and 
not steeped in the progressive development of Constitutional Law, it is likely 
that the courts will reach a judgement contrary to what was intended. The 
consequence of this is that the law stays the same and a contrary precedent 
gets set in law. It then takes another litigation process to undo the damage. 
Litigation can be an overwhelming experience, making it important to 
always stay focused. The high-powered nature of litigation is seductive. 
Organisations can get drawn into too much litigation, aligning themselves to 
issues and cases that are not part of their core focus. 
Even the Sash found itself drawn into cases that did not fit its values and 
core focus. This endangered its strongly-held principle of independence. 
Yasmin Sooka offers the following advice:
“An organisation must know its own agenda and what it wants to see happen 
in society. It must remain committed to its own foundational values. The 
organisation, regardless of what action is being taken, must always and 
constantly ask itself: Who is this going to benefit? And lastly, having built the 
reputation of the organisation, we must be careful that through the choices we 
make, we don’t lose that reputation.”
When litigation appears to be the only choice, it is important to be 
clear about whether a case is the right kind of case to litigate on to ensure 
maximum impact. Thus far the Black Sash has won every case that it has taken 
to court. 
The Sash recommends that litigation around public interest be 
accompanied by advocacy, such as social mobilisation or public advocacy. It 
should only be used when all other advocacy alternatives are exhausted. 
The Sash also cautions that engaging in litigation has long-term 
organisational implications. It is therefore important to build and 
institutionalise solid advocacy and litigation knowledge and skills throughout 
the organisation. As Alison Tilley says:
“Those engaging in advocacy work need to give power with both hands and 
take every opportunity for other people in the organisation to learn how to 
engage in advocacy.”
In sum, it remains important to hold the bigger picture and the focus of the 
organisation in mind.
Finally, as has been emphasised above, a strength of the Black Sash’s 
engagement with the state through litigation is that it does not undertake 
litigation lightly. For the Sash, litigation is not a means to rub government’s 
nose in its own incompetence but rather to get government to be 
accountable to the people and the Constitution. The Sash is careful not to 
brag in the media about its litigation victories. Victory and results are enough. 
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The Sash also remains committed to assisting government in making human 
rights real and to making its systems work efficiently. 
The back pay case (1999/2000)
Analysing data in the Grahamstown Regional Office database in the late 
1990s, Regional Director Jonathan Walton noticed an overwhelming 
number of clients had problems getting their grants approved timeously. 
When their grants were eventually approved, they did not receive any back 
pay.
The reason for this was the 1998 Regulation 11 of the Social Assistance Act 
of 1992. The regulation limited back payments on grants to 90 days from 
the date of approval of the grant. It did not take the date of application into 
account. This seriously disadvantaged applicants in provinces with long 
delays.
The Grahamstown Regional Office data showed people waiting from nine 
months and up to three years. No back pay had a serious impact on the 
lives of these poor people.
Geoff Budlender, the attorney who later took this case, described the scene 
as “taking food straight out of the mouths of poor people”. On the other 
hand, Eastern Cape government officials saw this as an opportunity to save 
the government money. Also, reports about fraudulent activities among 
some Eastern Cape DoSD officials responsible for grant payments surfaced 
later.
After monitoring the issue for a year, Jonathan Walton approached Allison 
Tilley, then Black Sash National Advocacy Manager, for assistance. Tilley 
checked with the other regional offices and found that the problem was a 
national one. She took all the facts and data to Adv Geoff Budlender at the 
LRC, who found grounds for a legal case. He formulated a case against both 
the National DoSD and the Eastern Cape Provincial DoSD on the grounds 
that Regulation 11, in relation to back pay, was unconstitutional. The right 
to social security has to be progressively realised.
1987: The community of Potsdam struggled 
against a reign of terror in the Ciskei but 
was determined to find a home in South 
Africa. The Black Sash assisted them to 
compile a dossier appealing to foreign 
governments to put pressure on the 
apartheid government to provide them with 
a home. 
Photograph: Black Sash Archives 
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The Black Sash helped the case by documenting the stories of people affected 
by the regulation. Meetings were held with the Minister to deal with the issue 
but nothing came out of them. The case was lodged and a trial date was set. 
Whilst this was in motion, Zola Skweyiya took over as Minister of Social 
Development. Ten days before the trial date, Black Sash Director Hillary 
Morris shared a platform with the new Minister. In her address she said that 
the Sash was saddened by the fact that it was about to take the DoSD to court.
The Minister was outraged that the issue had not been resolved and had gone 
as far as the court. He called several meetings with the Black Sash and the 
Finance Minister in an attempt to bring this case to resolution. A settlement 
was reached a day before the trial date.
In September 2001 the court set aside the regulation and issued an order 
giving people the right to back pay from the date of application. A year later, 
the President made R2.1 million available for back pay to all affected by the 
offending regulation.
At the time, the Sash recognised that the court order was not going to effect all 
the change needed. Thousands of people did not know about the court order, 
what it meant, or the process to follow to get back pay.
The Sash advice offices began a step-by-step analysis of the court order and 
how people could access back pay. It engaged in discussions with the DoSD 
and offered to assist in rolling out back pay.
The Sash asked the department for a print-out of all the names of people 
entitled to back pay. The DoSD sent these lists to the provinces to assist with 
the process.
Sash advice offices and kindred law firms took on the task of finding people 
entitled to back pay and bringing them to pay points to access their back pay.
Through lobbying, the Sash managed to get the DoSD to pay for pamphlets 
telling people about the court order and outlining how to access back pay.
1989: The Port Elizabeth Regional Office 
was almost destroyed in an arson attack.
Photograph: Bob Binnell 
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The back pay case was a huge victory for millions of South Africans, as well as for the Black Sash. As Sibongile Mkhabela puts it:“The back pay case opened the door for thousands and millions of 
people to walk through.”
There were many successes in the Sash’s advocacy strategy, with some 
hinging on how events unfolded. As Minister of Social Development, Zola 
Skweyiya exhibited greater political will to resolve the crisis in his department, 
and he knew and greatly respected the Black Sash. At the same time, the Sash 
was fully aware of the Minister’s support for the organisation and knew how 
to maximise it to bring about the desired change.
An insight from the Black Sash’s advocacy strategy is thus that one should 
always know when and what to feed into any opportunity that may arise in 
the political environment, which is fluid and constantly shifting and changing. 
Organisations need to be embedded in what is happening in the policy and 
legislative world so they can be responsive, flexible and pro-active. 
A further insight is that advocacy organisations should always strive to 
build a rights-based culture to support their strategies and approaches. Many 
issues can be settled before and out of court. Advocacy organisations need to 
look at how to build constructive engagement with government, labour and 
business institutions. 
Engaging in advocacy, more especially litigation, means organisations are 
playing in a very powerful field. Doing advocacy can be seen as high-profile 
work. A key learning from the Black Sash is the need to ensure that power 
as well as advocacy skills and knowledge are shared and grounded in the 
broader organisation.
The Black Sash’s experience also shows the importance of using media 
and publicity strategically and for the right reasons. During the back pay 
case, for example, the Sash received much media attention. They used a 
comprehensive media strategy to keep the issue on the agenda and to keep 
people informed as to what was unfolding. At the time victory was handed to 
the Black Sash, however, there was no compelling need to go to the media. 
The Sash felt that the victory itself was sufficient. The Sash never wanted to 
V. Conclusion
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show up government as inadequate or raise the profile of the organisation for 
its own sake.
Another key lesson from the Black Sash is that organisations advocating for 
change need to maintain a balance between their own agenda and profile, 
and achieving the aims set out at the start of an advocacy campaign. In all the 
work the Sash engages in, there is a solid thread that runs through its staff, 
Board, choices and advocacy strategies: The core values of the organisation. 
The Black Sash is a values-driven organisation. It holds its core values close to 
its heart and deep in its mind. 
The Black Sash’s advocacy model also clearly shows that advocacy cannot 
just be an add-on function. It needs to be incorporated as an approach to 
programme implementation and to reach organisational objectives. 
Another insight from the Black Sash is that organisational integrity is only 
possible through honest and transparent relationships with government and 
1982:The women of Crossroads fight tenaciously for the 
right to permanent residence in Cape Town.
Photograph: The Argus 
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civil society organisations. In advocacy, organisations must interrogate why 
particular steps are taken and who is going to benefit from an intervention. 
Being transparent in advocacy work means always keeping the target of 
an intervention informed and always including partners in the strategy. For 
example, having integrity means knowing when to stop with litigation in 
favour of using cooperative forms of engagement. It is also important to 
accept victory with humility and recognise the contribution of partners in 
advocacy campaigns.
The Sash is extremely protective of its independence, which has allowed it 
to cultivate its reputation. The Sash is equally respected by government and 
civil society. However, no advocacy organisation needs to go it alone. The 
Sash invites all advocacy organisations to share in its knowledge, experience 
and resources. In its more than 50 years of existence, the well-funded, well-
resourced Black Sash has built up a sophisticated machine, which it shares 
generously.
The Black Sash, with its unique, rich history and resources is a model for 
other organisations in the field.
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Back Cover:  1981: A Black Sash member pickets 
alone. Open-air meetings were prohibited. More than 
one person protesting was an ‘illegal gathering’.
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